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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The present appeal addresses the very narrow issue of whether appellant, 
Bernardino Barraza, has vendee' s lien rights that can still be enforced against a parcel of 
property located in Parma, Idaho. This is the only remaining issue in litigation 
attempting to quiet title to the subject property, which litigation has encompassed two 
lawsuits and lasted more than five years. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
This is the second appeal of case numbered 2009-8175 from the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon. The 
first appeal was from the district court's grant of Wilfrido Cuevas' s 1 two motions for 
summary judgment: the first holding that the prior default judgment quieting title to 
appellant Barraz.a void and of no force and effect, and the second holding that there was 
insufficient evidence to support any of Barraza's claims to the property or against 
Wilfrido, including Barraza's claims for unjust enrichment. 
By order dated March 22, 2012, this Court affirmed the district court's decision 
that the prior judgment quieting title in Barraza's name was void and affirmed the district 
court's decision denying Barraza's claim for unjust enrichment. This Court reversed that 
portion of the district court's judgment quieting title to Wilfrido because Barraza 
demonstrated factual issues regarding whether Wilfrido took title pursuant to Barraza' s 
statutory claim for a vendee's lien and remanded to the district court for consideration of 
that narrow issue. 
1 In an effort to comply with I.AR. 35(d) and avoid any possible confusion caused by identical surnames 
of Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas and his predecessor in interest, Mr. Juan Cuevas, Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas, the 
Respondent in this case, will respectfully be referred to as "Wilfrido." 
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On remand, Wilfrido brought summary judgment on Barraza's claim of a 
vendee's lien on the grounds that the unenforceable agreement for the purchase of real 
property cannot give rise to a vendee's lien and, alternatively, that the statute of 
limitations bars Barraza' s vendee' s lien claim. The district court, the Honorable Molly J. 
Huskey presiding, granted Wilfrido's motion for summary judgment and again entered a 
judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name. This appeal followed. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
The facts relative to the present appeal, none of which are in dispute, are as 
follows: 
The district court held that the alleged purchase agreement by and between 
Barraza and Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the subject property was unenforceable 
because it did not comply with the statute of frauds (Tr. (Vol. l) 96:22-97:10) and 
granted Wilfrido's motion for summary judgment, quieting title in Wilfrido's name free 
and clear of any interest held by Barraza. While this Court did not expressly rule on the 
statute of frauds issue, it explained in a footnote that Barraza's claim for specific 
performance, to the extent one was made, was "simply not viable" noting that "it is not 
readily apparent that the contract between the parties complies with the statute of 
frauds .... " Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 896, 227 P.3d 337, 343 n. 4 (2012). 
Barraza has not challenged any of the rulings that the alleged purchase agreement does 
not comply with the statute of frauds and that issue has not been presented on this appeal. 
To the extent that any purchase agreement existed between Barraza and Juan 
Cuevas, the two parties agreed to rescind it and Barraza vacated the property. R. 000030. 
On May 2, 2002, Barraza filed a notice of lien reflecting the rescission agreement. R. 
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000030. Wilfrido Cuevas filed the present action to quiet title on August 7, 2009. R. 
000001. Barraza answered, setting forth facts which allegedly give rise to his claimed 
vendee's lien, on August 28, 2009. R. 000001. 
II. RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Under Idaho's vendee's lien statute does a vendee's lien arise when the 
underlying agreement for the purchase of real property is invalid and unenforceable 
because it does not comply with the statute of frauds. 
B. If an invalid purchase agreement does give rise to a vendee's lien, does a mutual 
agreement to rescind the invalid agreement trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations for enforcing any such vendee's lien. 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Wilfrido seeks attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
This Court has two separate and distinct bases upon which it can affirm the 
district court's decision denying Barraza's claimed vendee's lien. First, because the 
underlying purchase agreement does not comply with the statute of frauds and is, 
therefore, invalid that purchase agreement cannot give rise to Barraza's claimed vendee's 
lien. Second, even if an invalid purchase agreement can create a vendee's lien, Barraza's 
rights to enforce the alleged vendee's lien are time barred because Barraza's and Juan 
Cuevas's mutual agreement to rescind the invalid purchase agreement is the event that 
triggered the running of the limitations period on Barraza's vendee's lien. For these 
reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this Comi affirm the decision of the District 
Court quieting title to the property in Wilfrido. 
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A. The district court properly held that a vendee's lien cannot attach to an 
invalid contract. 
Idaho Code Section 45-804 provides that a vendee's lien exists where, under an 
agreement for the sale of real property, a purchaser pays to the seller a portion of the 
purchase price and there is a subsequent failure of consideration. The first question 
presented in this case is whether Idaho Code Section 45-804 gives rise to a vendee's lien 
when the purchase agreement upon which the lien claimant relies is invalid because it 
violates the statute of frauds. Because recognizing a vendee's lien where the underlying 
purchase agreement is invalid would circumvent the statute of frauds and create an 
interest in property where there is incompetent evidence to show that a purchase 
agreement existed, this Court should hold that a vendee's lien only exists where the 
underlying purchase agreement is valid. 
Idaho courts of appellate review have not yet addressed the question of whether 
an invalid purchase agreement can give rise to a vendee's lien. However. the dissenting 
opinion in Shepard v. Dougan, which was decided on other grounds, supports the 
argument that the purchase agreement contemplated by Idaho Code Section 45-804 must 
be a valid purchase agreement. 
[The statute] is intended to apply to cases of contract for 
the purchase of real property and is meant to protect the 
vendee, where he makes a payment on an agreed purchase 
price; and for some reason or other the vendor either is 
unable to give a title or refuses to comply with his 
agreement to do so and the consideration for the contract 
fails. But I am unable to find any case where the lien 
provided for in this statute has been extended . . . to an 
incomplete contract or a so-called vendee who attempted to 
purchase under a void contract. ... 
58 Idaho 543, 564, 76 P.2d 442, 450 (1937) (Ailshie, J., dissenting). 
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A contract for a deed, which are absolutely void from the 
beginning because of the fact that the vendor is entirely 
lacking in power and authority to transfer the premises, 
cannot be the foundation for a vendee' s lien any more than 
they could be the foundation for any other legal or 
equitable interest in the premises. 
Id. at 567, 76 P.2d at 452 (Ailshie, J., dissenting) (quoting 0 'Neill v. Bennett, 49 S.D. 
524, 207 N.W. 453) (italics omitted). This Court's order dated March 22, 2012, noted 
that Barraza's claims for specific performance were not viable because "the record 
discloses several seemingly insurmountable obstacles to such a claim"-namely, that the 
alleged purchase agreement did not comply with the statute of frauds. Cuevas v. 
Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 896, 277 P.3d 337, 343 n.4 (2012). Based on the rationale set 
forth in the Shepard dissent, this Court should hold that an invalid purchase agreement 
that will not support a claim for specific performance is also insufficient to give rise to a 
vendee's lien. Accordingly, Wilfrido requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision that the invalid purchase agreement between Barraza and Juan Cuevas does not 
give rise to Barraza's claimed vendee's lien. 
B. The limitations period on Barraza's vendee's lien began to run on or before 
the date Barraza filed his claim of lien: May 2, 2002. 
If this Court rejects the arguments set forth above and holds that a purchase 
agreement that does not satisfy the statute of frauds can still give rise to a statutory 
vendee's lien, Barraza's claims must still fail because the statute of limitations has run on 
Barraza's right to enforce such vendee's lien. 
Whether the statute of limitations time bars Barraza's right to enforce any alleged 
lien is dependent on which event triggers the running of a limitations period. Barraza 
argues that the event that triggers the running of the limitations period was Juan Cuevas' s 
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quiet title lawsuit, filed on April 2, 2007, because that is the date that Barraza became 
aware that Juan Cuevas had breached the parties' agreement rescinding the invalid 
purchase agreement. App. Br. 7. Conversely, Wilfrido argues that the appropriate 
triggering event (if any) is the date Barraza and Juan Cuevas mutually agreed to rescind 
the invalid purchase agreement, which Barraza acknowledged by vacating the property 
and filing a lien. 
Idaho courts have not specifically identified the event which triggers the running 
of the statute of limitations on a claim for a vendee's lien. However, the vendee's lien 
statute provides valuable guidance as it protects the vendee "in case of failure of 
consideration." IDAHO CODE § 45-804. "The term 'failure of consideration' includes 
instances where a proper contract was entered into when the agreement was made, but 
because of supervening events, the promised performance fails, rending the contract 
unenforceable." World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884, 728 P.2d 
769, 773 (1986) (citations omitted). Based on this statutory language, the right to 
enforce2 a vendee's lien arises, and thereby begins the running of the limitations period, 
when the promised performance--delivery of title to the vendee-is no longer 
enforceable. 3 
In this matter, the alleged agreement for the purchase of the property was never 
enforceable because it violated the statute of frauds. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 
896, 277 P.3d 337, 343 n.4 (2012). Nevertheless, and even though the original purchase 
agreement was invalid, Juan Cuevas and Barraza mutually agreed to rescind the invalid 
2 A vendee's lien comes into existence at the time of payment of any part of the purchase price. Benz v. 
D.l. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 225, 268P.3d1167, 1177 (2012). 
3 It does not appear as though a mutual contract for rescission is properly characterized as the failure of 
consideration which gives rise to a vendee's lien rights. See, generally, Hoverson v. Evans, 38 ldaho 428, 
224 P. 1067 (1923) (discussing the nature ofa mutual contract for rescission of real property and refusing 
to read into such contract a requirement that the vendor repay any amounts paid to the vendee). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6 
purchase agreement. R. 000030. If the invalid purchase agreement was sufficient to give 
rise to a vendee's lien, the mutual rescission of the invalid purchase agreement was an 
additional event that rendered the invalid purchase agreement unenforceable. 
Accordingly, the rescission agreement is the event best characterized as the "failure of 
consideration" that would trigger the running of the limitations period. 
While the record does not indicate when Juan Cuevas and Barraza mutually 
agreed to rescind the invalid purchase agreement, Barraza memorialized the rescission 
agreement by filing the notice of lien claim on May 2, 2002 (R. 000030), so the mutual 
rescission had to have occurred sometime prior to that date. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
undisputed record evidence, as of May 2, 2002, the invalid purchase agreement had been 
rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, and the limitations period for Barraza to 
enforce his vendee's lien rights began to run on or before that date. 
In an effort to save his vendee's lien from the statute of limitations, Barraza 
argues that the triggering event for limitations was the date Juan Cuevas breached the 
rescission agreement by filing a lawsuit to quiet title. In support of this argument, 
Barraza cites to the Court of Appeals Decision in Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 
198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008) ("the five-year statute of limitation for Barraza to 
bring this breach of contract claim began to run when Barraza became aware of the 
breach. The breach alleged in Barraza' s answer occurred when Cuevas filed the instant 
quiet title action-April 2, 2007."). App. Br. 7. However, Barraza's argument is not 
supported by Idaho's vendee's lien statute, which provides relief only when there is 
failure of consideration on a purchase agreement. In this case, Barraza and Juan Cuevas 
mutually rescinded the invalid purchase agreement; if filing a quiet title action on April 2, 
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2007, was a breach of any agreement, it was a breach of the rescission agreement, not the 
invalid purchase agreement. Accordingly, this Court should reject Barraza's argument 
that Juan Cuevas' alleged breach of the rescission agreement is the event that triggered 
the limitations period for Barraza's vendee's lien. 
If Barraza did have an agreement for the purchase of real property sufficient to 
give rise to a vendee' s lien, such agreement was rescinded, by mutual asset of the parties, 
sometime on or before May 2, 2002. Because the mutual rescission created yet another 
reason why the invalid purchase agreement could not be enforced, that event triggered the 
running of limitations on Barraza' s vendee' s lien rights. Wilfrido, therefore, requests that 
this Court hold that Barraza rights to enforce his vendee's lien are time barred under all 
possible limitations periods and on such grounds, affirm the decision of the district court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly ruled that Barraza does not have and cannot enforce 
vendee's lien rights. First, Barraza and Juan Cuevas did not have an enforceable 
agreement for the purchase of real property that would give rise to a vendee's lien under 
Idaho Code Section 45-804. Second, even if a vendee's lien can arise under an otherwise 
invalid purchase agreement, because the invalid purchase agreement was rescinded by 
mutual agreement of the parties on or before May 2, 2002, the limitations period for 
Barraza to enforce his vendee's lien rights expired and any lien rights that Barraza did 
have are now time barred. For these reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the District Court quieting title in Wilfrido' s name. 
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Dated this 1st day of July, 2013 
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RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
By ;c---ra 
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the'J.'.U.i.u-
Attomey for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert Ward 
Hall, Friedly & Ward 
340 E. 2nd North Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
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